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ABSTRACT
Nuclear energy was one among business opportunities brought by the 
take off in science and technology after the Second World War. The 
narratives of the milestones of atomic history neglect the commercial, 
industrial and organizational aspects that made it possible. This paper 
concentrates on what makes the nuclear business exceptional (or not). 
We undertake an analysis of the nuclear supply business (designing, 
manufacturing and installing nuclear facilities) distinct from the analysis 
of the demand side (business operating nuclear power plants). We iden-
tify a continuing role of the state in civil nuclear businesses and a sym-
biotic relationship with private atomic business. And yet, for the most 
part the nuclear business applies the usual criteria of cost minimization 
and profit maximization within the boundaries of a non-perfectly com-
petitive market. We argue that the development of civil nuclear projects 
is core not just to business history as a discipline but to post-war 
history.
1. Introduction
As a consequence of the exponential increase in engineering and scientific funding brought 
forth by the Second World War, the immediate post war period witnessed a new era where 
science and technology became part of everyday vernacular culture. This ushered in new 
markets and business opportunities for a range of comparatively new industries such as 
electronics and telecommunications (radar and satellites) to aircraft (the jet engine), new 
materials and the civil uses of atomic energy (electricity, medical, industry and agriculture). 
The large-scale military industrial projects of the Second World War demonstrated how the 
fusion of science, engineering and large-scale management was possible, and how this 
became an accepted model for state led entrepreneurship (Balogh, 1991). The prime example 
of this was the Manhattan Project to build the first nuclear weapon, which employed thou-
sands of individuals in the private sector to undertaken work for the government on a scale 
not witnessed in modern times. Commercial nuclear power is the consequence of this move-
ment towards a synthesis of the will of the state with the ability of the private sector to 
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delivered projects and is an industry that symbolises the variety of mixed, ordoliberal, diri-
gisme economies (‘Colbertism’ perhaps)1 of the post war period that has been alluded to by 
Hall and Soskice in their seminar work, Varieties of Capitalism (2001).
In this paper we argue that the story of the development of nuclear power is part of the 
wider discourse on the role of the state in economic development after the Second World 
War and consequently of vital importance to the business history as a discipline. We will 
demonstrate that the ‘Entrepreneurial State’ view of Mazzucato (2013b) applies to the devel-
opment of the nuclear industry, that the state acted as entrepreneur in bringing forth new 
technologies and industries that may not have evolved through the oft repeated orthodoxy 
of the market beloved of neo classical or mainstream schools of economic thought that 
place the market at the centre of any debate on innovation, the well know Solow-Swan 
model of exogenous economic growth (Solow, 1956, Swan, 1956, Dimand & Spencer, 2009). 
Therefore, the creation of the nuclear industry was not begat by a Schumpertarian process 
of Creative Destruction (Schumpeter, 1942) but rather - building upon an earlier attempt by 
Mazzucato (2013a) to define the process in as ‘destructive creation’- an endogenous gov-
ernment led process of innovation consisting of a series of state-private hybrid institutions 
(to use the terminology of Douglass North’s 1991 ‘Institutions’) that could best be termed 
as Creative Construction in which the state guided and funded the research and develop-
ment of the key technologies2. For example, in the US by contracting firms such as 
Westinghouse and General Electric to undertake core research followed by a system of pref-
erential and relatively cheap finance to enable private companies build nuclear power plants. 
As per the variety of capitalism view advocated by Hall and Soskice nations engaged with 
nuclear power on a sliding scale of state – private relations, with private utilities and man-
ufacturers in the US, private manufacturers and a state utility in the UK and in the case of 
France state led R&D, a state owned manufacturer and state owned utility company. However, 
the fundamental premise remains: nuclear power was brought forth through institution-
alised state processes, whether in collaboration with the private sector or through a state 
owned nuclear-industrial complex and not through unconstrained market forces. This special 
issue illustrates this argument by outlining the business history of civilian nuclear power in 
countries that have attempted to engage with the technology to varying levels of success 
since the end of the Second World War.
This introduction argues that nuclear power is a business like no other in that it only came 
into existence through a state led process of innovation and implementation, in the same 
as many businesses that share several characteristics: first, the State’s involvement (regulation 
and laws, financing basic research in high-technologies and subsidies for competitive pricing, 
training human capital, diplomacy to facilitate the technological knowledge transfers). 
Second, there were hardly any precedents in the history of science for such a rapid transition 
between the first experiments and their applied industrial diffusion (military and civil) 
(Hewlett & Holl, 1989). Third, the scale and scope of business (multinationals and intensive 
capital investment, high fixed costs and the promise of future high profits). In short, these 
are ‘megaprojects’ required a massive investment of resources and capital to create an indus-
try from scratch (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Lethonen, 2019). And fourth, these new technologies were 
promoted by North America to forge economic and entrepreneurial bonds between the 
USA and its allies during the of Cold War. In Millward (2007) view, business was an instrument 
of the geopolitical strategy and nuclear power was no exception. The main difference was 
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the risks of nuclear accidents at the local level for civil and military uses, and the international 
level issue of Non-Proliferation during the Cold War.
Starting in 1955 until 1980 thirty countries began building and operating commercial 
nuclear reactors. Five American multinationals were dominate and built over one hundred 
reactors in the US, yet the global sales of nuclear reactors constituted a tight market and a 
potential opportunity for industrial economies such as the United Kingdom, West Germany 
and France (Rubio-Varas & De la Torre, 2017). However, the construction and operation of 
nuclear power plants presented a complex technological challenge, within the reach of only 
a few countries and reliant on state - private business relations. It can be argued, therefore, 
that a Schumpetarian logic cannot be employed to nuclear technology as compared to the 
existing and emergent fuels for power generation in the 1950s and 60s (Chick, 2007). Nuclear 
power fared badly in terms of cost, and complexity in comparison to the other, cheaper and 
ubiquitous resources available to electricity companies. Nuclear power was not a force of 
‘creative destruction’ satisfying market forces through game changing innovation, rather it 
was a technology willed upon the economy through political forces where the state was the 
lead entrepreneur in the creation of an entire industry, again a process of ‘Creative 
Construction’. This returns us to the work of Freeman (1974) and the ‘Economics of Industrial 
Innovation’. The nuclear industry were the result of state forces; in the United States govern-
ment research budgets and military procurement were behind the development of the two 
prevailing Light Water Reactor (LWR) designs, the Pressurised and Boiling Water Reactors 
(PWR and BWR, respectively) and in Britain the MAGNOX, gas cooled and graphite moderated 
reactors were the direct by-product of the British nuclear weapons programme (Pocock, 1977).
What were the economic incentives for business to invest in nuclear power? Who would 
develop nuclear power? State or private enterprises? We need to explain two historical 
phases: i) the Cold War ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme in context of relations between the 
USA and Western Europe during the 1950s and early 1960s (the ‘nuclear optimism’ time), 
and ii) the expansion of nuclear power programs around the Western World that led to larger 
plants which required greater safety measures and regulation from the 1970s onwards (the 
time of ‘nuclear uncertainty’). After 1960, nuclear technology had become a part of the 
economic fabric of industrialized Western nations after 1960 and the relationship among 
public agencies (experts and research), governments and business created a ‘seller’s market’ 
for American power reactors (and fuel) in Europe through Atoms for Peace and the Euratom 
plan (Hewllet & Holl, 1989; Armand et al., 1957). Within a context of opposition to nuclear 
power in response to nuclear proliferation in the 1960s, the European industry could not 
compete openly against the Americans on equal terms until the late 1970s. All of this affected 
business expectations and delayed the evolution of a specialized nuclear industry and there-
fore it is essential to understand the context in which nuclear corporations emerged and 
evolved, creating a global market for a new industrial sector.
This paper concentrates on what makes the nuclear business exceptional (or not) com-
pared to other sectors. Nuclear exceptionalism has been a recurring theme in political dis-
course since the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima (Hecht, 2010). yet, within the discourse 
on nuclear exceptionalism as a business, the power technology is seldom mentioned – 
despite currently accounting for eleven percent of the world’s electricity and historically 
being one of the largest single international commercial deals that can be transacted. This 
second type of exceptionalism applies to business history as the narratives of the great 
4 M. RUBIO-VARAS ET AL.
milestones of atomic history tend to ignore the commercial, industrial and organizational 
aspects of the industry. Consequently, Hecht’s nuclear exceptionalism is a pertinent theme 
in the business history of nuclear power in that whilst it is true that the state in the form of 
the military-industrial complex was principal agent in the development of the technology, 
the state also brought about the commercialisation of nuclear power through funding reac-
tor development programmes, prototypes and underpinning the finance necessary to fund 
capital intensive nuclear infrastructure. Whilst Mazzucato’s ‘entrepreneurial state’ hypothesis 
is applicable here, there is a further distinction that is important; whilst Mazzucato’s argu-
ment about the role of the state in creating the electronics, chemical and computer industries 
(to name but a few) is relevant, emphasis has to be placed on the continuing role of the state 
in nuclear power long after the aforementioned industries had, mostly, transferred to a 
partial or wholly private sphere, further underscoring Hecht’s exceptionalism.
It is an unfortunate truth that business history as a discipline has rarely touched upon 
the nuclear industry. This is surprising considering the number of seminal accounts of nuclear 
programs in capitalist democracies such as the United States (Balogh, 1991), West Germany 
(Radkau & Lothar, 2013), France (Hecht, 1998), and Britain (Hall, 1986) and in the communist 
world such as the U.S.S.R., East Germany [(Müller (2001) and Schmid (2015)], and under the 
military dictatorships in countries such as Argentina, Brazil or Spain during the 1960s and 
70s [Mallea et al. (2015) and Rubio-Varas & De la Torre (2017)]. By their part, the business 
histories of the electricity utilities and regulation tend to treat only in passing (if at all) the 
nuclear endeavours (Chick, 2007; Hausman et al., 2008; Hausman & Neufeld, 2011; Madureira, 
2017), with only few exceptions (Pope, 2011). This absence of a developed business history 
literature on the atomic power industry is surprising because from the beginning of the 
nuclear age there was a concern about the financing of atomic projects, national and inter-
national institutions considered the economic aspects as strategic, business consortia 
emerged and international transfer of knowhow became crucial [OEEC (1959); Maxwell et al. 
(1959); Federal Power Commission (1971)].
A business history approach has great potential to explain the economic and business 
historical development of nuclear energy. International business scholars have pointed to 
the potential effects of multinationals on host countries transferring technological knowl-
edge and organizational capabilities (Buckley, 2009; Jones & Khanna, 2006; McKinstry, 1997; 
Smith, 1998). As a theoretical concept in business history ‘learning by doing’ is defined as one 
of the processes by which firms, markets, and countries address uncertainty and imperfect 
and asymmetric information (Lamoreaux et al., 1999). Most recently, research enriches the 
debate by focusing on staffing strategies and knowledge transfer from advanced to devel-
oping economies including other variables (stock of human capital, corporate decisions, the 
ability of local partners to internalize the new knowledge) [(Meyer et al. (2011); Verbeke and 
Kano (2015); Álvaro (2014); De la Torre and Rubio-Varas (2018); Álvaro et al. (2020); Puig & 
Alvaro (2018)]. Neither is there a business history that explains the nuclear ecosystem 
(Scurlock, 2007), the industrial infrastructures, the markets, the attitudes of the entrepreneurs 
and the institutions that underpin the business.
The business history of the applications of nuclear technology – in medicine, agriculture, 
and industry (beyond power generation) – remains in its infancy despite the amount of 
research devoted to the history of national nuclear programs. The existing work has synergies 
with the economic history of the post-war period with the state at the core of all commercial 
nuclear activity to one extent or another and after the 1973 oil crisis determined national 
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energy policies that invariably placed nuclear power at the centre of future plans. 
Consequently, the debate on the development of nuclear power as an industry is central 
not just to business history as a discipline but the wider discourse on economic development 
after the end of the Second World War, such as debates on the nature of business and the 
firm (Penrose, 1959) or the ‘varieties of capitalism’ debate of the past two decades (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Hall & Thelen, 2008).
2. The pre-existing conditions and the traits surrounding nuclear business
Building nuclear power plants is a complex challenge in terms of macro level, technological, 
logistic and financial planning and these traits are generally shared by all civilian nuclear 
programmes (Valentine & Sovacool, 2010). As Rubio-Varas and De la Torre (2017) contend 
countries opting to include nuclear technology in their electricity mix shared similar eco-
nomic traits, namely strong governments, and/or the support of a superpower to ringfence 
any risk involved. These countries also possessed an integrated electricity network and/or 
sufficient electricity demand to support a nuclear reactor; whilst having the industrial base 
to develop the nuclear technology and/or accommodate the technological transfer. Finally, 
these countries had the ability to tap into the financial resources required (whether nationally 
or internationally).
In Figure 1 we have mapped the main traits and evolution of the pre-existing conditions 
upon which the nuclear industry developed. First, any country aspiring to build a commercial 
nuclear power plant must possess a pre-existing industrial base able to adopt knowledge 
transfer with the objective to adapt and quickly use the new technology, possibly to produce 
industry related capital goods. This technological absorption could be possible thanks to 
the economic and financial capabilities and expectations of the host economy. In this light, 
Figure 1. the backdrop for atomic business to arise: 1950–1979.
source: own elaboration.
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the new energy paradigm brought about by nuclear power was only available to developed 
and industrial countries, and therefore very far from the capabilities (if not desires) of devel-
oping countries (Drogan, 2016).
Second, government advocacy of the commercial benefits of nuclear power was key. The 
State assumed regulatory, safety and research functions, established the role of public util-
ities and established fiscal and financial support for the companies involved in the atomic 
program to promote a local self-sufficiency (see Figure 2 and Millward, 2007). At the same 
time, the government was the agent of economic diplomacy, which included inter-govern-
mental relations and contacts among industry, banks and businesses. Finally, the ad hoc 
publicly financed collaboration between the state, industry and the scientific community 
was essential to the application and adoption of technical innovations. As a consequence 
of this R&D spending soared in North America and Western Europe, triggering an intense 
period of human capital formation and development of a nuclear business ecosystem.
3. A business like no other, a business like any other
Countries opting to build civil nuclear power plants had different types of business organi-
zations involved in commercial decision making. In our analysis we separate the analysis of 
designing, building, and selling nuclear reactors (the supply side) from the business of pro-
curing and operating nuclear reactors (the demand side). Both sides faced different sets of 
problems and have distinct strategies and structures. It is important to note, however, that 
many large foreign companies were established in other business segments of the host 
country (as shareholders or through the patent market) which determined the nature of 
potential commercial outcomes.
Figure 2. the iron triangle for atomics business.
source: own elaboration.
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The supply side of the nuclear industry shares many features with global, highly regulated 
and, non-perfectly competitive sectors such as aviation, aerospace or, satellite communica-
tions. These sectors are (i) technologically sophisticated, (ii) involve a large share of first-of-
a-kind (FOAK) projects with limited chances to reproduce them in large quantities, (iii) require 
large-long-term financial commitments and, (iv) tend to have a symbiotic relation with 
governments.
These sets of characteristics already point in one direction: few companies are able suc-
ceed, and those that do, tend to be large companies able to mitigate the risks and deferred 
financial returns. The scale and scope of nuclear power plants required strategic organization 
of large firms, or in their absence, the formation of consortia. Initially, American multination-
als exported turnkey projects, especially in countries lacking a mature industry capable of 
adapting to stringent requirements. When the engineering capabilities improved in host 
countries and safety fears assuaged, companies moved towards joint venture contracts, 
producing beneficial results for both the exporter and importer (De la Torre & Rubio-Varas, 
2016). As a consequence of this, nuclear power is typified by a small number of suppliers; 
whilst companies from a dozen countries have successfully manufactured at least one com-
mercial nuclear reactor, only five countries (US, Russia, France, Canada and Germany) have 
managed to become true exporters of the technology beyond FOAK projects (see Figure 3).3
Until the sudden halt to the United States nuclear industry just before Three Mile Island 
incident in 1979, the world’s supply of nuclear reactors was dominated by two North 
American multinationals: Westinghouse or General Electric (or companies licensed by them) 
that built 80 percent of all reactors in the west. By the early 1980s, a dozen companies 
Figure 3. supply side: reactors built by vendor’s manufacturing country (1950s–2020).
source: own elaboration from the compilation of iAeA Pris databases.
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competed with the US multinationals supplying the core elements of the reactor such as 
generating sets, turbines, and control machinery. Few, however, could export entire nuclear 
projects beyond their own borders, and still fewer can do so today.
Successful international nuclear suppliers were limited to just two dominant business 
structures: either large integrated multinationals (e.g. Westinghouse, General Electric, KWU, 
Siemens) or state-owned national champions (e.g. Framatome, Atomenergoprom/Rosatom, 
AECL). The two largest, Westinghouse and General Electric, are good examples of the strategy 
employed by North American corporations when they became global firms using hierarchies 
and networks to manage complex processes to transfer knowledge to foreign affiliates, 
particularly in Europe (Jones, 2007). Whilst these processes were not free of difficulties, the 
role played by managers of engineering and consultancy firms was essential in mitigating 
risk (Taylor, 1994).
To understand why there were so few international companies undertaking civil nuclear 
projects, we have to look at the financial constraints inherent in large infrastructure projects; 
namely the capital intensive nature of nuclear power and the extended timeline for com-
pletion, loan repayments and profits. In this environment, financing by the supplier’s gov-
ernment became more important to customers than the overall cost evaluation of the project 
(United States &  Comptroller General’s Report to the Congress, 1980, p.10). Until the early 
1980s, US financial assistance, both directly through Eximbank loans, and indirectly by private 
loan guarantees to private loans, made it impossible for the European manufacturers to 
succeed in competition with the American nuclear manufacturers (De la Torre et al., 2020). 
The US policy changed after the election of Reagan in 1980, moving away from subsidies 
and ending cheap, preferential finance and opening the international market for alternative 
suppliers from Europe and Japan. With few exceptions, supplier nations provided cheap 
finance via public institutions to facilitate the export of nuclear power stations (Exim, 1970).
As this special issue demonstrates, the demand side of nuclear power is far more varied 
than the limited number of suppliers, with those acquiring reactors requiring specialist 
knowledge of the available alternatives. Companies acquiring civil nuclear technology 
required specialised knowledge on the alternatives available in the market. De la Torre et al. 
(2020) analyse the process of construction and connection to the electrical grid of four 
Spanish nuclear power plants with different financial and technological foreign partners. 
Three of them belong to the first generation of atomic plants and producing electricity from 
1969 to 1972 and the fourth was connected twenty years later. These four examples allow 
us to observe how the learning curve and the acquisition of nuclear engineering skills by 
host companies evolved. In Spain, the industry developed the ability to fabricate and service 
reactor components able to compete internationally.
Even though the number of suppliers was limited, the technological choice had important 
implications for local industries and global nuclear non-proliferation. In the mid-1960s there 
were an array of possible designs for nuclear reactors, the basic differences depending on 
the fuel, the cooling and the moderating elements, and until the late 1960s there were no 
clear advantages to any of them. Eventually, three types of reactors were commercialized 
internationally (Fisher, 1997): (1) the light water nuclear power reactor, using low enriched 
uranium as its fuel and ordinary water as its coolant and moderator, built originally to a US 
design in Western countries and to a similar Soviet design in the USSR and Eastern European 
countries; (2) the gas graphite reactor using natural uranium as its fuel, moderated by graph-
ite and cooled by carbon dioxide – a technological design favoured by Britain and France 
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(although abandoned by the latter in the 1970s in favour of the PWR). (3) Finally, Canada 
marketed a quite different nuclear power reactor using natural uranium as its fuel and heavy 
water as its coolant and moderator. Within each of these three main types there were to be 
further design categories. For instance, among the light water reactors, pressurized (PWR) 
and boiling water (BWR) reactors were developed in the West, while the Soviets built two 
types: the VVER series and the RBMK, the type made conspicuous by Chernobyl, which was 
closer to a MAGNOX in which moderation was undertaken by the use of a graphite core. 
Consequently, engineers and scientists were at the core of commercial negotiations and 
transactions involving the acquisition of civil nuclear technology, independently of whether 
the reactor was of domestic manufacture or an imported one (De la Torre et al., 2018).
The type and size of the chosen reactor determined the magnitude of the upfront invest-
ment, which in turn meant that not all utilities could undertake nuclear projects (Krautmann 
& Solow, 1988). Where the supply of electricity was fragmented among a number of private 
utilities (e.g. US, Spain), few utilities had large enough markets and deep enough pockets 
to undertake projects with more than two reactors at a single site (see Figure 4). Most under-
developed countries still today have rather unconnected regional/local networks too small 
to accommodate the standard nuclear technology. Partially to overcome these issues, pri-
vately owned utilities in fragmented markets decided to create joint ventures and consortia 
for specific nuclear projects. In other countries, ownership expanded beyond the electricity 
sector, inviting co-ownership of the nuclear plant by other industries (different from elec-
tricity companies) and/or public bodies -municipalities partially own nuclear power plants 
in Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Germany, for instance (Rubio-Varas, 2021). This 
was never without conflict, as Jensen-Eriksen (2020) demonstrate in this Special Issue. In 
Finland the private companies have promoted their interests in the nuclear sector, where 
Figure 4. Demand side: nuclear reactors built by buying country (1950–2020).
source: own elaboration from the compilation of iAeA Pris databases.
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manufacturing industries have regarded cheap and abundant power as a key component 
of their business strategies. From the 1950s onwards, nuclear energy seemed a particularly 
attractive option. However, private firms faced opposition from a number of actors. They 
included the Soviets, who were eager to sell their reactors, while the Finns wanted to buy 
Western ones; centrist and left-wing politicians, who favoured state-controlled options; and 
finally, the environmental movement, which from the 1980s onwards opposed the construc-
tion of all new reactors.
In contrast, other nations where the electricity sector remained under the control of a 
single state-owned utility could accommodate larger reactors in groups of four or more 
(most notably France, but also the United Kingdom, the ex-Soviet Union, or the regional 
monopolies of Japan). Their electricity markets were largely integrated. As a consequence, 
standardization was more likely to occur in these countries as lesser agents took part on the 
decision over the reactor choice and repeated buys of the same type of reactor could be 
accommodated as shown in Figure 4.
Beyond the size/scale effect, the ownership structure has a crucial impact on the financial 
costs for those aspiring to buy civil nuclear technology. While for private companies profit-
ability constitutes the primary decision criterion, a public investor may value other benefits 
for society (job creation, energy independence, industrial development, etc) above business 
profitability. Depending on the ownership and commercial structure chosen to develop a 
new nuclear project, the financing may come directly from the government (in other words, 
from taxpayers and public debt), or if undertaken by the private sector, from a combination 
of equity and (long-term) loans from national and international sources.
Crucially, capital costs differ according to the kind of promoter in question (public, private 
or mixed). On the one hand, state-owned companies have access to cheap capital when 
borrowing money. The interest rates on government bonds are usually relatively low com-
pared to interest charged for financial loans taken up by private actors. For that reason, the 
financing of public projects is basically done though the issue of bonds, and this for 100 
percent (D’haeseleer, 2013). This situation may apply to the largely state-owned companies 
such as Electricité de France (EdF) and Vattenfall (Sweden). On the other hand, private inves-
tors in liberalized markets operate in an uncertain environment, and their interest rates are 
the highest, depending on the rating of the company and the type of project. In the sense 
that of Rosenberg (2004) pointed out, the application of sophisticated managerial skills in 
order to exploit the vastly expanded capabilities of nuclear technology. The Finnish example 
with large customers acting as coinventors is an intermediate case that lowers the cost of 
capital for the investors (D’haeseleer, 2013, pp. 25–26).
In most parts of the world, many aspects of the nuclear ecosystem involve business 
decisions (Arora et al., 2019). For the most part the nuclear business applies the usual criteria 
of cost minimization and profit maximization within the boundaries of a non-perfectly 
competitive market no different from others of similar characteristics. In that sense, nuclear 
is a business like any other. yet, in some countries, supply and demand of nuclear technology 
belongs to a single entity (e.g. EDF) or exists under a crossover of ownership between 
supplier and client (e.g. General Electric participation in utilities). From this perspective, 
Mascolo (2020) studies the construction of a nuclear power station in the South of Italy at 
the end of the 1950s, a joint study between the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the Italian government. It shows that Garigliano nuclear power plant is 
unique in terms of energy, politics and finance because it was intended to be an 
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international model, both in technology and operating procedures, for the construction of 
other nuclear power stations around the world. This case has to be contextualised in the 
complex scenario of the Italian nuclear policy of those years dominated by a clear split 
between the interests of the private and public spheres. Historically, the nuclear business 
decision making has been strongly marked by geopolitical strategy, a multi-layer-hyper-reg-
ulation and social opposition. All of which has contributed to also making nuclear a business 
like no other.
4. The ‘state as entrepreneur’; varieties of capitalism as applied to the 
nuclear business
The state - private enterprise relationship varied between nations and across borders and 
individual nuclear industrial sectors varied depending upon the socio-economic and political 
context of the country. Therefore, the work of Hecht on nuclear exceptionalism has a rela-
tionship beyond Mazzucato’s entrepreneurial state which is more closely aligned with the 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ view put forward by Hall and Soskice (2001). As a consequence, the 
nuclear exceptionalism Hecht alludes to had many forms depending on where the industry 
was operating. This goes beyond a socialist versus capitalist market economy argument as 
baring the Soviet Union, nations developing nuclear sectors in the 1950s were predominately 
based on a capitalist model, but one that had a role for the state acting as coordinator and 
facilitator, and in some cases, namely France, both customer and supplier. The relationship 
between the state and private enterprise depends on the initial purpose of a particular 
nuclear industry – in the case of Britain, France, USA and the USSR this was weapons – and 
the level at which state – business interactions took place. Consequently, in the United States 
for example, whilst the state was the facilitator of reactor research and development, it 
utilised private enterprise in the form of companies such as Westinghouse, General Electric 
and Du Pont (to name but three) as designer and vendor, whereas in the United Kingdom 
research and development was a government activity and in the form of the Central 
Electricity Generating Board was customer, but private enterprise built and delivered reactors 
of their own design but based upon the underlying government research (Chick, 2007). At 
the other extreme, the nuclear industry in France was completely government owned and 
run, and the state nuclear company acted as researcher, supplier, vendor and customer. 
Industries in nations such as Sweden and Switzerland started from a nuclear weapons per-
spective but soon coalesced around private vendors using Westinghouse PWR technology 
and, eventually private utility companies and, with varying levels of state participation. This 
is the prevailing model in the majority of nations utilising nuclear power but one further, 
final caveat has to be made: in some nations the origins of the industry were domestic and 
military, either overtly (Sweden), implicitly (Italy and Switzerland) or covertly (Spain, 
Argentina and Brazil) whilst in others (Finland and the Netherlands, for example) the indus-
tries were built upon imported technology for power generation purposes only [(Mallea 
et al. (2015), Rubio-Varas & De la Torre (2017), Jonter (2016), Evangelista (2011) and Foradori 
(2014)].
These phenomena are illustrated by Jensen-Eriksen (2020), where Finish private industry 
cooperated with the state to introduce nuclear power to feed local industry and yet due to 
the geopolitical considerations of ‘Finlandization’ had to utilise both Soviet (hybridised with 
western control systems and standards of safety) as well as Swedish reactors based upon 
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American designs, all operated by companies owed by both the state and private enterprise. 
Roitto et al. (2020) confirm this view of the Finish experience and that the demands of private 
enterprise were at the core, whilst also drawing comparators to the United Kingdom and 
Germany where the evidence suggests that, in the early post war period at least, private 
enterprise was wary of being involved in the nuclear industry, a state of affairs that changed 
in the following two decades to reflect two very different realities in Germany and Britain; 
in the former private utilities, designs and vendors and in the later, state utilities and designs 
delivered by private contractors. As De la Torre et al. (2020) and Mascolo (2020) also demon-
strate, the Spanish experience formed by the Franco government of the 1960s and an Italian 
experience formed by a politically weak state that was a civil service led technocracy with 
delineated state – private sets of relationships that produced different local outcomes when 
interacting with the overseas financial institutions tasked with developing industrial devel-
opment. Consequently, nation states which adopted nuclear power did so in a number of 
divergent ways that reflected local economic variations based on the socioeconomic and 
political context of place that affected technical and investment outcomes.
These local variations based upon social-economic and political factors specific to each 
nation in this period underline the view of Hall and Soskice (2001). But this is not without 
qualification; whilst Hall and Soskice advocate two polar opposites of capitalism, Liberal 
Market Economics (LME) and Coordinated Market Economies (CME) there are arguments 
within the varieties of capitalism literature that point to an eventual convergence of national 
economic strategies over time that tend towards the LME variety of capitalism (Gevurtz, 
2011), and the prevailing nuclear orthodoxy of PWR reactors owned by private utilities (with 
some notable exceptions such as France, for example) supports this to an extent, even 
though it is apparent that significant aspects of the CME still exist (Donzé & Smith, 2018). 
Nevertheless, up until the ‘big switch’ towards light water reactors in the 1970s (France 1975, 
Britain 1978) the early years of nuclear energy was typified by distinct national business and 
technical strategies based on local conditions and from the perspective of the burgeoning 
varieties of capitalism literature in the field of business history, nuclear power provides an 
opportunity to study the role of state commercial relations during the post-war period that 
reflects the CME view of Hall and Soskice and the prevailing ordoliberal orthodoxy of that 
time [Thomas and Westerhuis (2014), Iversen and Soskice (2019), John and Phillips-Fein 
(2016), Kipping (2003), Hall and Gingerich (2009) and Kiran (2018)].
Despite the exceptionalism discourse it is difficult to identify business structures or strat-
egies that are unique to the nuclear sector. We would like to argue that it shares features 
with some of the technologies of the second half of the 20th century (aerospace, aviation, 
telecommunication) with high capital requirements (human and financial), symbiotic rela-
tionships with the state (including a military side), and tight markets. Indeed, work by 
Edgerton underscores Mazzucato’s view that the state had a pivotal role in guiding devel-
opments in the nuclear industry because the role of government was central to each high 
technology industry that evolved after 1945 (Edgerton, 2005). However, one aspect of this 
state role is the notion of the success or failure of a state led innovation strategy; as the 
article by MacKenzie, (2020) in this special issue demonstrates, the state led commercial 
nuclear industry in the United Kingdom was an expense failure comprised of plutonium 
producing designs that were the offspring of the British nuclear weapons programme (which 
could never be exported due to proliferation concerns), whereas the American industry 
based on non-proliferating power designs, whilst military in its inception and conception, 
BUSINESS HISTORy 13
as demonstrated by Rubio-Varas & De la Torre (2017) was supported by cheap finance pro-
vided by the Atoms for Peace programme to generate exports.
5. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this special issue is to illustrate (and advocate for) the central role that nuclear 
power should play within the business history of the post Second World War period. In this 
introduction, with reference to the articles published within this Special Issue (De la Torre 
et al. (2020); Jensen-Eriksen (2020); Mascolo (2020); MacKenzie, (2020) and Roitto et al. (2020), 
we have also argued that the study of the nuclear industry is crucial in forming theoretical 
perspectives on the role of the state in the economy after the end of the Second World War 
and how different variants of capitalism evolved in Western economies during this period. 
Nuclear power is related to many inherent themes concerning the role of the state in indus-
trial development and the rise of science and technology as a socio-political institution 
during a period of rapid socio-economic changes. This collection has demonstrated that 
whilst many countries had a superficially similar set out outcomes for local nuclear industries, 
the reality was one of a variety of approaches to implementing nuclear power generation 
that swung from a completely state owned, manufactured and managed industries to ones 
that were privately owned in their entirety but all were underpinned by state - business 
institutional arrangements without which, there would not be a nuclear industry operating 
today in any of the countries mentioned in this special issue. The business – political nexus 
was at the core of innovation in the sector and was integral to the creating the ecosystems 
that have supported the nuclear industry for more than half a century. By shedding light on 
this, we believe that we have demonstrated a new series of linkages between institutional 
views that support the endogenous theory of economic growth and the burgeoning varieties 
of capitalism literature in business history, whilst all the while added credence to Mazzucato’s 
view of the state as the main entrepreneur in developing modern high technology industries. 
It is our hope that this study of the nuclear industry will provide a fertile breeding ground 
for additional work in other areas of study within business history that will shed light on the 
role of state – business relationships in the implementation of innovative technologies and 
methods that at times have irrevocably changed the prevailing economic zeitgeist and 
orthodoxies.
Notes
 1. Studies of the French ‘Colbertist’ economic paradigm of state led capitalism, named after 
the 17th century French statesmen are sorely lacking from the economic and business histo-
ry literature, with the last academic study of any kind occurring in 2007 (Cohen, 2007). With 
the rise in interest in the varieties of capitalism literature and the influence of Mazzucato’s 
theories on concepts on innovation and industrial growth, we believe that the time may be 
ripe for a study of Colbertism and its influence on ordoliberal and mixed ‘third way’ econo-
mies.
 2. The role of technology in exogenous and endogenous growth theories can be attributed to 
the work of Solow and Swan (1956) in the case of the former, and Kenneth Arrow (1962) in the 
case of the latter. Debates in the 1980s led by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) omitted technol-
ogy per se in the endogenous growth model. Recent work by Bloom et al. (2020) has placed 
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technology back into the debate on economic growth and consequent draws attention to the 
role of the state and the nature of capitalist economies.
 3. The remaining exporters were all FOAK projects. The British Nuclear Power Group (TNPG) built 
the Italian reactor at Latina. Sweden’s ASEASTAL built the two reactors the Finish NPP at 
Olkiluoto; The Chinese four reactor exports to Pakistan could arguably be a repeated sale, but 
in our opinion does not make China a nuclear exported as yet.
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